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ABSTRACT
The new technologies, digitalization, algorithms, big data, artificial intelligence 
are already changing our lives and commercial habits. The technological revo-
lution with new products and services is transforming the market and business 
operators. There is a general understanding that new technological improvements 
benefit competition. The question is, whether competition models are adequate and 
ready to deal with the challenges associated with new technologies. In recent years, 
there has been a revived interest in the concept of innovation and its application 
in competition policy and law. However, proper examination of its influence on 
competition policy is lacking. During the last decades, there have been attempts to 
explain the relationship between competition and innovation by including various 
innovation models in competition analysis. The innovation instruments have devel-
oped. Despite these developments, there are still diametrically opposed theoretical 
approaches, from completely ignoring the concept of innovation in competition 
law to the ones that develop a specific economic test in competition analysis. This 
paper will try to analyze and compare different approaches to the intersection 
of competition and innovation. Systematic theories that assess innovation in the 
context of competition are scarce. Competition authorities have been focused on 
issues of consumer and social welfare, rather than on the impact of innovation on 
the competition. 
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The idea is to try to define the role of innovation in competition analysis. The ques-
tion is whether competition law needs new tools in order to understand new develop-
ments and innovations. 
The authors argue that competition has its own instruments that can be applied to 
new models with certain adaptations. Certain regulatory instruments are necessary, 
but they can be implemented without stifling innovation and the development of new 
technologies. The authors attempt to offer possible solutions for the existing chal-
lenges based on the state of art research. The challenges associated with the market 
definition and market power are explained. It is argued that competition analyses 
should acknowledge that innovation is essential for competition in the digital era.
KEYWORDS: innovation, competition law, digital era
1. INTRODUCTION
The technical revolution presents a new challenge to every aspect of society. 
Innovative services and products are transforming markets, their actors, as 
well as the way we live and communicate. Digitalization has brought nume-
rous benefits to the usual manners of conducting business, along with certain 
risks. The rapid change affects the usual understanding of undistorted compe-
tition with many different actors involved. With the improvement of Internet 
technologies and the advances in artificial intelligence systems, the potentials 
have increased even more. Innovations lead to new social and business oppor-
tunities. Many potential benefits for European citizens and undertakings are 
on the rise, but some concerns have to be addressed too. 
This paper aims to explore the implications of competition rules application. 
The authors shall examine the problem from multiple angles and perspectives. 
The main dilemma concerns the question of whether competition law with 
its existing tools is prepared to deal with new challenges posed by the digital 
revolution. It is necessary to realize how the legal framework has to be adapted 
and improved. It will be shown that the main issue concerns the flexibility of 
the current competition rules. Economic growth must be followed by a well – 
developed competition policy. The main quandary is whether current competi-
tion rules are still adequate for the digital economy environment. Specifically, 
can we apply traditional competition concepts to new markets and actors?
During the years, we have experienced rapid evolution and adaptation of com-
petition law to new challenges. The Report on competition policy1 tries to 
identify possible obstacles for competition in the changing environment. Ac-
cording to the Report, the basic principles enshrined in the Treaties can ensure 
1 Crémer, J. et al: Competition policy for the digital era, final report, Luxembourg, 2019.
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consistent enforcement.2 However, special features of the digital economy de-
serve particular attention. Some traditional concepts will have to be improved. 
One of them is the definition of the relevant market and market deficiency that 
can be useful background for adjusting the existing legal framework.3
Innovation shapes consumer preferences, with lots of new products and 
high-skilled services on the market.4 Traditional competition assessment must 
be adapted to the new economic developments. 
New digital markets with innovative products and services are not devoid of 
anti-competitive practices. However, they bring about new challenges from the 
aspect of competition regulation and enforcement. The idea is to shed some 
light on the implications of innovation in the digital transformation of com-
petition. 
2. IS THERE A ROOM FOR INNOVATION IN COMPETITION 
ASSESSMENT?
When we consider the ramifications of the digitalization of society, many new 
notions and processes emerge. It is sometimes difficult for legal scholars to 
fully comprehend all the complex technological features associated with di-
gitalization. Therefore, the synergy between various disciplines and practi-
tioners is necessary. The first goal of competition has always been consumer 
welfare. This is even more highlighted in the era of innovation and new tech-
nologies. A dynamic approach is necessary to adjust competition rules to new 
developments. We, therefore, agree with Cremer et al. that the application of 
existing rules with some modifications could be satisfactory. They stress that 
“the competition policy must be vigorous, disciplined and coherent. It must 
rely on solid analysis of the new market settings … which will imply that “the 
invisible hand of the market” must be supplemented by “invisible hand of com-
petition authorities or of the legislator.”5
The dilemma is about the direction of the development of competition law 
in the new digital era. The primary objectives6 ensuring undistorted compe-
2 Ibid., p. 3.
3 Ibid., p. 5.
4 On platform-enabled services see: Bodiroga-Vukobrat, N., Pošćić, A, Martinović, A.: “Old 
Economy“ Restrictions in the Digital Market for Services, InterEuLawEast, V (2), 2018, pp. 
169-188.
5 Ibid., p. 14.  
6 See: Van den Bergh, R.: Comparative Competition Law and Economics, Cheltenham, 
2017, p. 86.
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tition are still relevant, but slight modifications are needed. Digitalization is 
changing our society and economy and it is of utmost importance to integrate 
innovation concepts in the competition analysis.7 
Innovation is defined as a notion that “encompasses the commercialization of 
newly invented or upgraded products (product innovation) or production and 
distribution process (process innovation).”8 Besides, some definitions look at 
the disruptive feature of innovation and ones that focused on the side effects 
of innovation to markets.9 In the end, the fact is that innovation affects the 
competitive process in a market, so it is not really important which definition 
we opt for. 
There is a need for coordination and mutual understanding between different 
regimes. A lot has been said about innovation and competition separately, but 
there is a lack of comprehensive studies on the intersection and mutual influen-
ce between innovation and competition policy.
The imperative of ensuring a stable and competitive market brings interrelations 
between competition and innovation into focus. There are various methodolo-
gies proposed. We find Cleynenbreugel’s approach, who says that his intention 
is not to propose progress in the relationship between those two disciplines, but 
just to help in understanding the position of innovation in the competition law 
analysis, the one that is most convincing.10 There is no uniform understanding 
of the extent to which competition law analysis should take into consideration 
the innovation argument in the analytical assessment.11 So far, the doctrine has 
been oriented on investigating whether innovation arguments can become part 
of the theory of harm, as the basic test in competition analysis. Cleynenbreugel 
summarizes different approaches under two opposed clusters. The first includes 
scholars who argue that the role of innovation in the competition is external. 
According to them, the competition law enforcers are focused on market stru-
cture and behavior. The innovation argument cannot be sustained in favor of 
anticompetitive restraints. Innovation is beyond any competition assessment. 
The innovation arguments are not perceived as crucial in the competition 
analysis. That is more or less the current position of the European Commission. 
The innovation principle is recognized only as a part of the competitive mar-
7 Competition policy for the digital era, p. 126.
8 Van Cleynenbreugel, P.: Innovation in competition law analysis: making sense of on-going 
academic and policy debates, in Nihoul, P., Van Cleynenbreugel, P. (eds.): The Roles of Inno-
vation in Competition Law Analysis, Cheltenham, 2018, p. 3.
9 Ibid., p. 3. 
10 Loc. cit. 
11 Ibid., p. 6.
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ket environment. The anticompetitive enforcers have not developed the concept 
of innovation separately. The agencies have been focused on price effects and 
ignoring non-price parameters of competition as quality and innovation. Stucke 
speaks of the price king or price-centric approach.12 It is difficult to measure the 
impact on anticompetitive harm and dynamic efficiency. 
The contrary view sees innovation as an integral part of the competition evalu-
ation and obliges the enforcement agencies to incorporate innovation conside-
rations directly into competition appraisal. In contrast to the first cluster, it sees 
innovation as a value to be called to justify or condemn certain undertaking’s 
behavior.13 This position can be noticed in merger analysis where innovation 
is a benefit to be protected under the competition law analysis. Sometimes this 
approach is criticized because the test of “significant impediment to innovati-
on” should be compatible with the existing competition framework.14 It seems 
that those opposing views differentiate between the external or internal role of 
innovation in competition. 
The main fear is that competition law is stuck on the old dominance theories 
based on static concepts. The competition must foster a more dynamic approa-
ch in the terms of Schumpeterian competition. It means competition based on 
new products and new technologies.15 This concept has not evolved as much 
as Hayek’s concept of “competition as a discovery procedure”.16 The problem 
with this process is that it is too general with no clear grounds for how it should 
be applied in specific competition cases. Both concepts are focused on inno-
vation. According to Kerber, there is no elaborated concept that describes the 
assessment of innovation in competition cases yet.17
Innovation has numerous benefits for society as a whole. The consumer gains 
new innovative products. In the high-tech industry, firms must innovate and 
search for new products to attract new users. On the other hand, without pro-
tection through intellectual property rights undertaking would lose incentives 
to innovate and invest in new technologies. The traditional enforcement has 
always been more focused on price increases and analyzing the market through 
possible market sharing and other anticompetitive conducts. The idea is to 
12 Stucke, M. E., Grunes, A. P.: Big Data and Competition Policy, Oxford, 2016, p. 109 and 113. 
13 Van Cleynenbreugel, P., op. cit., p. 8.
14 Ibid., p. 9.
15 Kerber,W.: Competition, Innovation and Competition Law: Dissecting the Interplay, in Ge-
rard, D. et all. (eds.), Dynamic Markets, Dynamic Competition and Dynamic Enforcement, 
Bruxelles, 2018, p. 37.
16 Ibid., p. 38.
17 Loc. cit.
Intereulaweast, Vol. VII (2) 2020
250
include innovation in the possible anticompetitive assessment. Caution is ne-
cessary. Taking into consideration innovation in competition incorrectly may 
enhance the risk of possible mistakes. Too much focus on innovation processes 
can discourage future investments.
We argue that competition plays one of the essential roles in fostering inno-
vation, but only in an open market. Therefore, innovation must become an 
essential element in every competition assessment. 
3. GOALS OF COMPETITION POLICY IN THE DIGITAL ERA
The traditional goals of competition law have been focused on increasing com-
petitiveness, better allocation of resources, and improved consumer choices. 
Traditionally, economists have relied on the model of social or total welfare, 
for which it is irrelevant whether the benefits are realized by consumers or pro-
ducers. EU competition law does not treat consumer’s and producer’s welfare 
alike. Consumer welfare is valued more highly than producer welfare. Nume-
rous provisions substantiate this conclusion.18 
We can ask ourselves whether traditional goals have to be changed with the 
advancement of new technologies. Consumer welfare is still relevant, but with 
certain modifications. The existing concepts will have to be redesigned to re-
flect the current values.
Currently, it is crucial to include all consumers into consideration. Every plat-
form user may be affected by competition violations. It means that in the di-
gital environment end-users, as well as undertakings, may be influenced by 
competition harm (consumers acting as part or outside of their commercial 
activities). The difficulty potentially lies in demonstrating the existence and in 
quantifying consumer harm. 
Digital ecosystems created in the digital world display certain particularities. 
The issue of market power might be different from the “traditional” defini-
tions, as in some circumstance’s platform provider can be the “unavoidable 
trading partner”. The situation is described as the “intermediation power”.19 
Traditionally, market power is measured by market shares. Here, a concept of 
market share is not useful. In the digital market, there are numerous parame-
ters besides market power that could be relevant.20
18 See: Pošćić, A.: Europsko pravo tržišnog natjecanja i interesi potrošača, Zagreb, 2014, p. 46 
and further.
19 Competition policy for the digital era, p. 4
20 Ibid., p. 50. 
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Consumer must sense quantifiable benefits from digitalization and innovation. 
The innovative open market will be developed so that every actor can pro-
fit from it. Consumer welfare must be maximized. Free functioning of the 
market ensures consumer choice and confidence. The new market encourages 
producers to constantly offer new or improved products and services. It is not 
enough to offer a variety of products but also to innovate and offer new produ-
cts. Innovative techniques are used to offer new technologies and deploy new 
marketing strategies. Undertakings are under constant pressure to invest in 
new technologies and to adapt their business process to new circumstances.21
4. DEFINITION OF THE RELEVANT MARKET IN THE DIGITAL 
ERA
Digitalization affects market structure and entails specific competition con-
cerns. There are many new notions to be discovered and understood, such 
as disruptive innovation, big data, algorithmic collusion, two-sided markets, 
market power, network effects. We have already mentioned that so far com-
petition authorities were reluctant to consider the innovation aspects in their 
assessment. The traditional static examination has been centered around prices 
and their consequences on consumer harm, instead of on innovation concepts. 
The definition of the relevant market is one of the main elements in competi-
tion assessment.22 It is the first step in any market evaluation and it is someti-
mes called “market screen”. The novelty is that we have multi-sided markets 
with two or more sets of users where platforms can effectively cross-subsidize 
between different categories of end-users. It is usually the situation where one 
consumer receives a product for free and the other pays for it. In that situati-
on, SSNIP (“small but significant and non-transitory increase in price”) test23 
may be too simple and not adaptable to multi-sided markets. Using the old test 
would probably result in defining markets too narrowly. The SSNIP-test takes 
in consideration only the existing products and examines if the increase of 
existing prices of 5-10 % would encourage consumer to switch to other produ-
cts. The two- and multi-sided markets complicate the picture. As long as there 
21 Marcos, F.: Innovation by dominant firms in the market: damned if you don’t…. but 
damned if you do? in Nihoul, P., Van Cleynenbreugel, P. (eds.): The Roles of Innovation in 
Competition Law Analysis, Cheltenham, 2018, p. 35.
22 See Whish, R., Baily, D.: Competition law, ninth edition, Oxford, 2018, p. 26 and fur-
ther., Pošćić, A. : Europsko pravo tržišnog natjecanja i ekonomija dijeljenja, Zbornik Pravnog 
fakulteta Sveučilišta u Rijeci, 40 (1) 2019, p. 249 and further. 
23 Van den Bergh, R., op.cit., p. 142 and further.
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is certain competition on the market, the regulators have to be careful. Digital 
companies usually redefine the boundaries of markets. 
Filistrucchi makes a distinction between two-sided non-transaction mar-
kets and two-sided transaction markets. The first does not have transactions 
between two sides of markets and the per-transaction fee is not possible. Those 
are mostly media markets. On the other side, transaction markets, e.g. payment 
cards, have a lot of transactions between the two groups of users and usually, 
the platform charges fees for joining and using the platform. In the situation 
of transaction markets, there should be only one relevant market. On the other 
side, in non-transaction markets products from one market may not compete 
with products from other markets.24  
The traditional SSNIP-test looks only at existing products, without taking into 
consideration future products. It requires analyzing substitutes between all 
existing products. This test is suitable for static market, whereas in new dyna-
mic markets there is a constant flow of new products that change the degree of 
substitutability between them.25 
Today, a market assessment still “suffers” from not observing non-price ele-
ments. Traditionally, too much weight is on the price, but in the digital world, 
the user can receive more advantages in joining network with free products. 
As we mentioned before, consumer in the widest possible meaning should be 
considered. Network effects and other peculiarities of the market might have a 
consequence of defining the market more broadly. The Commission’s attitude 
is conservative, in this respect. The traditional tools are still widely applied. 
The free products should be taken into consideration, as well as the inter-
dependence of consumers in multi-sided markets. The dynamic assessment 
should be promoted. 
The way we approach the definition of the relevant market will have an impact 
on the finding of possible market power. The digital revolution challenges the 
standard definition of the relevant market. Presently, we are witnessing dyna-
mic markets under the constant evolution. The idea is based on the Schumpe-
terian thinking of dynamic and innovative markets under constant pressure of 
unexpected innovations.26 Usually, the definition of the relevant market is more 
or less focused on the product definition of the relevant market, where product 
24 See: Copobianco, A., Nyeso, A.: Challenges for Competition Law Enforcement and Policy 
in the Digital Economy, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 9 (1) 2018, p. 24. 
25 Kerber, W., op. cit., p. 36.
26 Robertson, V.: Delineating Digital Markets under EU Competition Law: Challenging or 
Futile? The Competition Law Review, 12 (2) 2017, p. 132.
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differentiation may develop problems in the determination of substitutability.27 
It is really difficult to define the market in dynamic industries with so many 
products partly substitutable.28 Today we have multi-sided markets that have 
to be assessed together. Probably a broader definition will be a better solution, 
so in that way, we could avoid too much enforcement that can have an adverse 
impact on innovation and consequently consumer welfare.29 Many issues need 
to be resolved in defining digital markets. 
The market delineation is tricky when we have differentiated digital products. 
The Commission has so far hesitated to give strict guidelines in this respect. 
We do not have an established test for defining the relevant market in the new 
digital era. Online advertising is one example. The Commission has not deci-
ded if the online and offline advertisement markets are one broad market or 
separate, whether mobile and online ads are the same market, as well as whet-
her non-search and search-based ads are part of the same market.30 
One decision that might suggest of Commission’s shift in slowly considering 
other parameters is the famous Google Shopping case. In 2017, the Commis-
sion found that Google has abused its dominant position in the general online 
search market by giving an illegal advantage to its own comparison shopping 
service.31 It is the first case in which the Commission assessed algorithmic 
manipulation that may violate competition.32 Some scholars see this as a pa-
radigm shift,33 as it might suggest that the Commission is changing its poli-
cy towards the protection of non-price competition in new digital markets.34 
Before, the Commission has disregarded other market concerns. For this part 
of the assessment, it is interesting to see the way the Commission defined the 
relevant market as one that encompasses general search services. It is the mar-
ket where users do not pay for services, but “pay” with their data. Before, the 
Commission did not consider free markets at all.35 Here, we have an exchange 
of a service for data.36 The Commission distinguished two separate product 
27 Ibid., p. 144. 
28 Ibid., p 145.
29 See Robertson, p. 146.
30 Ibid., p. 145.
31 Case A.T.39740 Google Search (Shopping), Commission decision of 27 June 2017. 
32 Bania, K., The European Commission’s decision in Google Search, in Lundqvist, B., Gal, 
M. S (eds.), Competition Law for the Digital Economy, Cheltenham, 2019, p. 264.
33 Ibid., p. 265.
34 Ibid., p. 266. 
35 Ibid., p. 273.
36 Case A.T.39740 Google Search (Shopping), paragraph 158.
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markets: the general search engines and social networking.37 The proof that 
the Commission takes other parameters can be seen from the wording: “…..
even though general search services do not compete on price, there are other 
parameters of competition between general search services. These include the 
relevance of results, the speed with which results are provided, the attractive-
ness of the user interface and the depth of indexing of the web.”38
According to Bania, the Commission did not explain two issues. First, the 
Commission failed to identify advertising markets as those affected by discri-
minatory abuses. The second issue concerns the lack of precise explanation of 
taking the free products market into consideration. The Commission did not 
indicate precisely why the market for the provision of general search results 
was considered to be the relevant market.39 
As it can be observed, there is a need for some change in the future Commis-
sion’s assessment, although some slow steps have been taken. We find useful 
recommendation given by Robertson. She suggests taking into consideration 
the market side, where revenues are generated, but also on the other side, whe-
re services are provided for free. The constant dynamic characteristic of the 
market should always be taken into consideration. If necessary, the relevant 
market has to be redefined. The digital markets are quite distinguished and 
exposed to fast innovation with a short duration. That is why the market should 
not be defined narrowly. The online /offline paradigm is sometimes left aside, 
but she suggests taking into consideration also offline pressures in defining the 
substitutability. She urges for a more important position of innovation in every 
competition analysis.40  
Innovation is regarded as an important element in future competitive markets. 
Traditional static concepts of competition tools will have to be improved and 
adapted to the new reality. There is a consensus that innovation is welcome in 
competitive markets. The problem is with static concepts of competition tools 
that until now have been ignoring innovative concepts. 
Market definition is not an end, but only the first step in competitive assessment. 
The future will be to use a “more innovation specific assessment approach”, 
in other words, a test that takes into consideration research and development.41
37 Google Search (Shopping), paragraph 179.
38 Google Search (Shopping), paragraph 180.
39 Bania, K., op. cit., p. 280.
40 Robertson, V., op. cit., p. 151.
41 Kerber, W., op. cit., p. 47.
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5. APPRAISAL OF MARKET POWER IN THE DIGITAL ERA
Market power in the digital environment might prove to be different than in 
traditional markets. Digital markets have some peculiarities that distinguish 
them from traditional markets. One is a large amount of data. Possessing and 
controlling market data may be one of the key components in determining the 
firm’s market power, although we are not convinced that competition agencies 
are taking them into consideration. Google Shopping case might suggest a 
change in direction. One of the criteria that were determinative in establishing 
Google’s dominant position was that a significant number of consumers trust 
the relevance of search results provided by Google and are unlikely to mul-
ti-home, even if  Google were to degrade the quality of its general search servi-
ce.42 It is one of the pieces of evidence showing that the Commission is slowly 
taking into consideration parameters other than price, such as quality-related 
concerns.43 Platforms may take a lot of different roles: as intermediaries, as 
collectors of consumers’ preferences, as suppliers, but also as providers of cer-
tain services. Possessing a large amount of data allows them to make informed 
decisions. In every industry, there is an increase in the amount of data.44 Data 
are included in the value chain and change a traditional paradigm to data and 
innovation-driven firms.45 It enables platforms to provide better services and at 
the same time attract new users. 
When one firm becomes a data-driven winner, it automatically becomes the 
system leader. The suppliers are locked. Examples are Google and Amazon.46 
Data has become a critical resource in competition law, and it is necessary to 
explore how it should be taken into consideration. 
The term that is more and more used is data innovation. Besides data, there is 
a lot of other factors that have to be taken into consideration, such as network 
effects, market tip in favor of one firm, high-quality data, and predictive mo-
deling tools.47 Some platforms may offer access to other users in an arbitrary 
or even discriminatory way. 
42 Google Search (Shopping), paragraph 312.
43 Bania, K., op. cit., p. 283.
44 Lundqvist, B., Regulating competition in the digital economy, in: Lundqvist, B., Gal, M. S 
(eds.), Competition Law for the Digital Economy, Cheltenham, 2019, p. 10.
45 Ibid., p. 11.
46 Loc. cit.
47 Ibid., p. 12.
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There are many undertakings with a strong market concentration in the digital 
economy.48 Network effects play a significant role in digital markets. They 
operate in a way that the more users it attracts, the network becomes more 
attractive for other users. The quality of services also increases. The dilemma 
is whether this concentration should be condemned by competition authori-
ties. In the digital economy, every company wants to gain a new market. The 
value of the platform increases as more and more people use it. One company 
becomes the winner of the market and a gatekeeper. It is important to be the 
first, not the best.49 The firms endeavor to take the leading position in the early 
development of a particular technology. 
One phenomenon is especially evident here. It is the “winner takes it all” that 
prevails. On the other hand, the market power of one undertaking may be of 
short duration, as the changes are very fast. Markets in the digital economy 
have certain characteristics that distinguish them from others: more vigorous 
competition “for” the market, than “in” the market, network effects, multi-si-
ded markets, innovative markets, protection of intellectual property rights, and 
big data.50 It means that there is the vigorous competition to enter the market 
and replace the dominant platform. 
Market power will be difficult to determine. It is extremely important not to 
condemn every undertaking in a leading position with inventive products. The 
changes in the new economy are quick. The dominant position is not prohibi-
ted, but its abuse is. The main concern is not to condemn the dominant firm as 
the one that violates competition law only because it produces innovative and 
different products and services. 
The traditional tools for the assessment of market power could be inadequ-
ate. High market share as the main criterion in the determination of market 
power must be combined with other indicators, as some services are offered 
for free and some firms do not have a high market share for a long time.51 
The competitive constraints from buyers and sellers should also be taken 
into consideration. Market power, as well as the definition of the market, is 
exposed to constant change. There are suggestions in favor of data gathering 
48 Zimmer, D.: The digital economy: a challenge for competition policy?, in:  Nihoul, P., Van 
Cleynenbreugel, P. (eds.): The Roles of Innovation in Competition Law Analysis, Cheltenham, 
2018, p. 299.
49 Schmidt, H. K.: Taming the shrew: is there a need for a new market power definition for the 
digital economy?, in Lundqvist, B., Gal, M. S (eds.), Competition Law for the Digital Economy, 
Cheltenham, 2019, p. 57.
50 Ibid., p. 44.
51 Copobianco, A., Nyeso, A., op. cit., p.24.
257
Ana Pošćić, Adrijana Martinović: Rethinking effects of innovation in competition in the era of new digital technologies 
and data analytics as indications of market power. Data has become a valu-
able asset.52
The market power must be assessed by analyzing the specific service that the 
platform provides. The Commission thinks that leading platforms should act 
as regulators of the ecosystems and networks with special responsibility. The 
protection of competition for the market becomes essential, with dominant 
platforms behaving as “regulators”. It means that they establish certain rules 
of interaction while maintaining fair and undistorted competition on their plat-
forms.53 
Despite general characteristics, platforms are heterogenic, and every situation 
will have to be assessed independently.  
We have already stressed that market shares are not an appropriate tool in the 
digital economy as an undertaking’s high market share can be very fragile. It 
is probably the right time to abandon too much reliance on market share.54 Ac-
cording to the Commission’s praxis, a substantial market share is seen as one 
of the indicators of a dominant position. Of course, the Commission always 
stressed that high market share is not the only factor and its importance varies 
from market to market according to its structure.55 Commission has also been 
focused on the time scale and the position of other competitors on the market.56
The collection and commercial use of data pose competition considerations 
as we are facing even more competition between firms. Previously, the public 
authority has been the only collector of data. The problem is that until now 
they had no interest in storing and collecting them. Gradually, data has been 
marketed to consumers and firms. Following Google, Amazon, and Facebook, 
private entities started collecting and storing large amounts of personal and 
non-personal data. 57 Collecting data has become profitable as firms realize 
that possession of personal and non-personal data might give them a compe-
titive advantage. With necessary data and with the “help” of algorithms they 
might focus their products or services on the targeted group of consumers. 
Today we are speaking of competition for and with data.58 
52 Lundqvist, B., op. cit., p. 25.
53 Ibid., p. 5. 
54 Schmidt, H. K., op. cit., p. 63.
55 CJEU, Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Com-
munities, EU:C:1979:46, paragraph 40.
56 Schmidt, H. K., op. cit., p. 56.
57 Lundqvist, B., op. cit., p. 6.
58 Ibid., p. 7.
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System leaders might act as gatekeepers and collectors of data not giving ac-
cess to other business users in the ecosystem. Other brick-and-mortar firms 
will try to compete with leading gatekeepers, but it will be difficult as they 
collect and control all the incoming data. The only way for the “old firms” to 
survive is to become innovative and to collaborate in joint platforms. Another 
peculiarity of digital markets is “tipping”. It is a situation in which the leading 
platform can increase its market share through network effects and rise to a 
position that is almost invulnerable to competition. The system leader can act 
as “winner takes it all or most” and becomes the ruler of the ecosystem.59
If we have an innovative high-tech leading firm, it doesn’t automatically mean 
it is a monopolist. Even if it is in a dominant position, it will be of no relevance 
if the admission of new competitors is free. 60 The definition of a dominant 
position and its assessment has been developed in the Court’s case law. In the 
case of United Brands61 and Hoffman la Roche, the dominance has been defi-
ned under EU law as a position of economic strength enjoyed by an underta-
king, which enables it to prevent effective competition from being maintained 
on a relevant market, by affording it the power to behave to an appreciable 
extent independently of its competitors, its customers and ultimately of consu-
mers. This means that the undertaking’s decisions are largely indifferent to the 
other actions. Those elements are still relevant in the digital era. Some authors 
criticize the criterion of independence as not fit for the digital era. The reason 
is that no one can stand alone and act independently. Another point for debate 
is the ability to increase prices due to their independent position. In the digital 
environment, there can be other abuses not connected to price increases. 
In the digital environment, the paradigm “winner takes it all” or “snowball 
effect” is true as when an undertaking reaches the “tipping” point while ha-
ving a large number of users, it attracts more and more customers. Here, we 
have a few firms with a strong market position. Personal data present a strate-
gic value as platforms combine data from multiple platforms and the operator 
can optimize the products for end-users. We are facing more competition for 
end-users than in traditional markets. The operators create multiple platforms 
that can connect user’s data with them with the improved service. Large plat-
forms possess a large amount of data and can control new entrants. It would be 
the same if they possessed advanced technology. Here the term ‘competition 
for the market’ is true, as problems with leveraging can raise concerns. We 
59 Ibid., p. 9.
60 Marcos, F., op. cit., p. 43.
61 CJEU, Case 27/76, United Brands Company and United Brands Continental BV v. Com-
mission, of the European Communities, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22, paragraph 65.
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have competition for the market and especially competition for more than one 
market.62 
With multi-sided platforms, the competition for more than one market can 
occur, as the leading position of one market operator can allow the leveraging 
market position to other markets. In this sector the interconnection and the bu-
ilding of the ecosystem are relevant. Firms compete on multi-sided platforms 
and can amplify their power to other connected markets. Those markets are 
vulnerable. Undertakings with significant market power may sometimes be 
under pressure for innovation from other firms and their position may over-
turn. 
The specificity is that products are sometimes given for free in exchange for 
personal data. This can be connected to the zero-price effect where consumers 
opt for free products instead of opting for products for which they pay and are 
of better quality. The textbook example is one in which you will receive free 
shipping if you decide to buy products exceeding a certain amount.63 It is a si-
tuation where one side of the platform subsidizes the other side of the platform. 
The platform gains certain advantages even in that situation. The exchange is 
usually in the form of data. Consumer data are seen as a non-monetary form.64 
It only means that the traditional definition of market power may not be suited 
for the digital economy. The concept of dominance should be flexible enough 
to cover all possible solutions in the market. 
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have tried to shed some light on the future of competition 
policy in the new digital era. The idea was to offer possible directions for the 
understanding of the position of innovation in competition assessment. Some 
can find competition policy too slow, not able to respond to the fast develop-
ments and innovations. A dynamic approach would help in a faster and smo-
other adaptation of competition rules to new improvements. In order to foster 
a dynamic approach, it is necessary to understand competitive forces under-
pinning developments, so it is possible to distinguish normal from disruptive 
behavior. As already mentioned, too much regulation can be problematic, as 
it might stifle new ideas. Also, the self-adaption of new markets should not be 
underestimated. 
62 Copobianco, A., Nyeso, A., op. cit., p. 23.
63 Schmidt, H. K., op. cit., p. 53.
64 Competition policy for the digital era, p. 44. 
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It is important to insist on clarity. The new paradigm is not needed. There is 
a necessity to reinterpret the existing rules and apply them to new situations. 
The regulators will have to improve their capabilities and try to understand 
new technology. Despite the need to invest in education, innovation is usually 
unpredictable. As Kerber rightly points out, we still have very poor knowledge 
about innovation processes in markets.65 
It is important to develop tools that are in line with traditional competition 
goals; consumers and end-users. We believe that the analysis of the market and 
possible market power could be a good starting point for the protection of fu-
ture competitive markets. The dynamic assessment could enable the develop-
ment of new definitions and notions. The doctrine advises a wise and cautious 
approach.66 The enforcers should shift slowly from price-fixing abuses and 
market sharing to including innovation in the analysis. As always, the right 
balance between promoting and controlling innovation should be maintained. 
Last, but not less important, is the proposition to enhance cooperation between 
competition and data protection authorities. It is an unknown part of data-dri-
ven economy. Data are becoming valuable competition law resources. 
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